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 Introduction and background 
 
Elections are the keystone of democracy as we know it, 
but the spectre of corruption and manipulation hangs over 
all electoral processes. For as long as elections have 
been held, they have been subject to efforts to corrupt 
them. Vote-buying and fraud were features of elections in 
ancient Athens and Sparta two and a half thousand years 
ago (Staveley, 1972: chap. 5) as well as in early modern 
elections across the world (Posada-Carbó, 1996; 2000), 
and the same problems haunt electoral conduct in 
virtually all contemporary states. Moreover, there is 
evidence to suggest that electoral corruption may be 
growing as a problem.  
 
Not so many decades ago, many of the world‟s most 
authoritarian states refrained from holding elections at all, 
whereas in the post-Cold War world, changes in value 
systems and the forces of globalisation have made it 
increasingly difficult for states to resist the pressure at 
least to pay lip service to democracy.  Consequently, 
many more states have begun to hold elections, though 
the quality of electoral conduct in a number of them 
leaves much to be desired.  
 
Before embarking on a review of the scholarly literature 
on this topic, it is necessary to provide a brief 
consideration of what is meant by the term „electoral 
corruption‟ and what types of activities are collected 
under this rubric. The phenomenon here termed 
„electoral corruption‟ goes by a number of names: 
electoral malpractice, electoral misconduct, electoral 
malfeasance, electoral fraud, and electoral manipulation. 
These terms will be used interchangeably in the present 
analysis. The defining feature of this activity is that it 
involves the abuse of electoral institutions for personal or 
political gain. 
 
Electoral corruption can be broken down for the sake of 
convenience into three types according to object: the 
manipulation of rules (the legal framework), the 
manipulation of voters (preference-formation and 
expression) and the manipulation of voting (electoral 
administration) (see also Birch, 2009). 
 
The manipulation of rules involves the distortion of 
electoral laws so as to benefit one party or contestant in 
an election. Electoral rules are manipulated to some 
extent in virtually all states, democratic or otherwise, but 
electoral rule manipulation can be classified as a form of 
electoral corruption when it seriously distorts the level 
playing field subtending elections, as, for example, when 
the rules governing candidacy prevent certain political 
forces from contesting elections, or when large sectors of 
the adult population are excluded from the franchise. 
This survey of electoral corruption provides an overview of the phenomenon, including a 
summary of the scholarly research on the topic and an assessment of the relevance of 
research findings for the practitioner community. The paper is grounded on the assumption 
that elections are the keystone of modern democracy, and that understanding electoral 
corruption and addressing its main causes can improve electoral integrity around the world. 
 
 3 
Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution – Briefing Paper (IDCR-BP-05/11) 
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IDCR) 
Part of the University of Essex Knowledge Gateway 
 
© Sarah Birch 2011 
 
The manipulation of voters takes two principal forms: 
efforts to distort voters‟ preferences and efforts to sway 
preference expression. Voters‟ preferences are distorted 
by means of a variety of illicit forms of campaigning: 
campaign tactics that are deceptive, activities that violate 
campaign finance laws (typically through over-spending), 
the use of state resources to support the campaign of a 
particular candidate or party, or severe bias in media 
coverage of the election. These techniques are designed 
to alter voters‟ true preferences. The other main form of 
voter manipulation involves the alteration of how 
preferences are expressed at the polling station, through 
vote-buying or intimidation in the aim of increasing the 
vote of a specific political force. 
 
The manipulation of voting takes place through a variety 
of different forms of electoral maladministration, from 
classical acts of fraud – personation, ballot-box stuffing, 
mis-reporting – to other more subtle acts that skew the 
conduct of an election in favour or against a particular 
contestant. These can include the under-provision of 
voting facilities in opposition strong-holds, lack of 
transparency in the organisation of the election, bias in 
the way electoral disputes are adjudicated in the courts, 
and so on. 
 
Broad analytic distinctions such as this are useful in 
helping us to conceptualise the different ways in which 
elections can be manipulated, yet it is virtually impossible 
to list all the different varieties of electoral corruption. Not 
only is the manipulation of elections highly context-
dependent, but technological advances and sheer 
ingenuity have led to a regular increase in forms of 
electoral manipulation ever since elections as we know 
them began to be held 2,500 years ago. 
 
That said, it is important to note that there are many 
serious problems with electoral processes that cannot be 
attributed to intended manipulation. The line between 
intentional corruption and unintended maladministration 
stemming from incompetence, negligence, lack of 
resources or simple bad luck is a fine one, and it is often 
in practice impossible to be sure the extent to which a 
given problem with an election can be attributed to 
intentional manipulation or an unintentional mistake 
(Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). A large number of the 
problems that beset contemporary elections are the result 
of limited state capacity and lack of experience rather 
than intentional efforts to subvert the democratic process. 
 
But whatever the cause of poor electoral conduct, it 
cannot be denied that when elections go wrong, 
democracy and governance can suffer considerable 
damage that often takes a very long time to remedy. 
Following this brief introduction to the problems of 
electoral corruption, the following sections consider in 
turn the salient issues in this topic area, recent research 
findings, and how these research findings can be put to 
use by practitioners. A short conclusion and a 
bibliography wrap up the analysis. 
 
Key issues and problems  
 
Electoral corruption is an area in which practitioners have 
arguably made greater advances to our understanding 
than have academics. Academic researchers have been 
relatively slow to take this up as a topic of scholarly 
analysis, and electoral malpractice is only just now 
emerging as a coherent sub-field within the discipline of 
political science. The overview that follows therefore 
combines the insights of practitioner and academic work 
on this topic. 
 
Four topics have dominated the study of electoral 
corruption: debates over how best to measure the quality 
of elections; studies of the causes of electoral corruption; 
analyses of the effects of poor electoral conduct; and 
strategies for improving the quality of elections. 
 
The measurement of electoral corruption 
 
Whenever one sets out to measure something that is 
covert, one encounters problems arising from the fact that 
those involved in it have a strong incentive to cover up or 
disguise in some way. The measurement of electoral 
corruption is thus something that it is difficult to do 
directly, and most measures of this phenomenon rely on 
indirect or proxy measures of some form.  
 
Electoral misconduct has been measured in two main 
ways: (a) by means of perceptual data such as reports 
written by observers, legal charges, court rulings, or the 
findings of popular surveys and opinion polls; or (b) by 
means of „election forensics‟ (Myagkov et al., 2009) that 
involve undertaking statistical analyses of election results 
in order to identify patterns that are unlikely to be found in 
unmanipulated elections. 
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To study electoral corruption, researchers have relied on 
a variety of different data sources, including Taylor and 
Hudson‟s coding of electoral irregularity in 112 states in 
the mid-1960s (Taylor and Hudson, 1972), the „fraud‟ 
indicator in the World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al., 2001), Robert Pastor‟s database 
of „flawed‟ elections (Pastor, 1999a), Birch‟s database of 
electoral malpractice (www.essex.ac.uk/government/ 
electoralmalpractice), or the Freedom House „electoral 
process‟ subscore of the well-known Freedom in the 
World Index (www.freedomhouse.org). 
 
Cross-national survey datasets that contain questions on 
electoral integrity include the Latinobarometer and 
Afrobarometer survey series, Module I of the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the 2004 
International Social Survey Programme survey. 
 
A wide variety of country-level data have also been 
employed to analyse electoral corruption in particular 
contexts, including surveys (McGann and Dominguez, 
1998; Stokes, 2005), election results (Berezkin et al., 
1989; Powell, 1989; Oberst and Weilage, 1990; Baum, 
1991; Mayfield, 1993; King, 2001; Christensen, 2005; 
Herron and Johnson, 2007; Myagkov et al., 2007; 2008; 
2009) and official criminal data (Molina and Lehoucq, 
1999; Lehoucq and Molina, 2002; Eisenstadt, 2002; 
Ziblatt, 2009). 
 
The causes of electoral corruption 
 
Politicians in all countries face a trade-off between the 
desire to be re-elected and the desire to retain legitimacy 
(Schedler, 2002b, pp. 36-7; Birch, 2007). They may be 
tempted to engage in electoral malpractice in order to 
ensure their re-elections, but in many contexts the cost of 
misconduct in the electoral sphere will be too high, as 
electoral conduct will, if detected, have such a negative 
impact on their legitimacy that it will not be worth the risk. 
This is not true in all contexts, however, and the study of 
the causes of electoral corruption is largely a matter of 
identifying the conditions under which the corruption of 
elections will seem to make sense to political actors – in 
the sense that the risk to legitimacy will not be a sufficient 
deterrent – and the circumstances under which the risks 
of corruption are too high. 
A number of different factors have been found to shape 
risk perceptions and consequently behaviour by 
politicians when confronted with the choice of whether „to 
corrupt or not to corrupt‟ (Birch, 2009). 
 
The first main category of factors is derived from the 
institutional framework governing elections. In theory 
many different institutions could affect levels of electoral 
corruption in a state, from territorial organisation to 
executive type or judicial structure, but the two aspects of 
institutional design that have been most thoroughly 
studied in the context of electoral corruption are electoral 
system type and electoral management body design. 
 
A second set of factors that shape the electoral context 
are those related to a state‟s socio-economic 
circumstances; how rich it is, how well educated its 
population, how traditional its culture, and the extent to 
which corruption pervades other aspects of political and 
economic life. 
 
A final set of factors relates to a state‟s insertion in the 
international arena, and specifically, the extent to which it 
welcomes international election observation missions to 
monitor its elections. 
 
All of these factors have been found to be associated with 
the degree of electoral corruption. In addition, the 
dynamics of the interactions between governing party, 
opposition elites and masses has also been shown to be 
closely associated with the quality of elections. In some 
states political forces in power are able successfully to 
co-opt and buy off the opposition for extended periods of 
time by means of patronage perks of various types, and 
minor offices in government. In other cases efforts to 
quell opposition through co-optation have been less 
successful, and active repression has been necessary. 
Sometimes repression is successful and in other cases it 
is not successful. The precise outcomes of contests 
between political groups in society typically depend on 
their relative assets as well as on a variety of contingent 
factors (Magaloni, 2010). 
 
The consequences of electoral corruption: 
 
Electoral misconduct can have a number of severe 
consequences for democratic performance. Most 
obviously, electoral corruption can result in the „wrong‟ 
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people being elected, and can therefore subvert the 
democratic will.  Electoral corruption also makes the 
resulting government less representative and less 
accountable than it would otherwise be; those who are 
elected in corrupt elections will obviously have less of an 
incentive to do as their constituents would want them to 
do. Poor-quality elections can also have knock-on effects 
for popular perceptions of the legitimacy of political 
leaders and it can undermine the bonds of trust that must 
link the people with their rulers as well as individual 
members of the political elite with each other. 
 
But poor-quality elections also have a number of 
consequences that go beyond the bounds of 
representation and democratic accountability as narrowly 
understood. Corrupt elections can lead to corruption in 
other spheres. This is true for two principal reasons. 
Firstly those elected through corrupt means are more 
likely to be the sorts of people who would be prepared to 
engage in other forms of corruption once elected. 
Secondly, many forms of electoral malfeasance are quite 
expensive, and politicians are often tempted to use other 
forms of corruption to build up election war-chests that 
can then be used to fund their re-election through 
nefarious means. For this reason, corrupt elections can 
represent a considerable drain on the public purse. 
 
Under certain circumstances, electoral corruption can 
have even more dire consequences in that it can provoke 
violence and sometimes even lead to civil war. 
 
Strategies for reducing electoral corruption: 
 
Historically, electoral corruption has been found to vary 
considerably from period to period. This has naturally 
caused scholars to wonder why in some contexts we 
observe dramatic increases or decreases in this 
phenomenon. Practitioners are particularly interested in 
the factors associated with decreases in electoral 
corruption, and research has established that there are a 
number of particular types of context in which electoral 
corruption declines, depending on changes in electoral 
institutions (including the franchise), changes in levels of 
socio-economic development and international pressure 
(including electoral assistance). 
 
One of the questions that has particularly occupied a 
number of scholars in recent years is whether the holding 
of elections eventually leads to democracy, in the sense 
that once a state begins to hold elections, the country will, 
under the right conditions, gradually become more 
democratic and elections will become cleaner (Howard 
and Roessler, 2006; Lindberg, 2009; Magaloni, 2010), or 
whether, on the contrary, electoral corruption and 
manipulation enable leaders in authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian states to use elections to prop up their non-
democratic regimes (non-democratic regimes that use 
elections to help shore them up are often referred to as 
„electoral authoritarians‟ (Schedler, 2006; cf Ziblatt, 2009), 
or „competitive authoritarian‟ states) (Levitsky and Way, 
2002; 2010). 
 
This section has mapped the terrain of electoral corruption 
studies. In the next section we go on to survey the 
principal findings of research in this field. 
 
 
Evidence and analysis  
 
Electoral corruption has been studied by political scientists 
for decades, yet most of the existing research is based on 
case studies of particular elections in particular countries. 
The systematic comparative study of electoral irregularities 
remains in its infancy. 
 
Yet research in the field of electoral corruption has yielded 
a number of important insights into this phenomenon and 
has gone some way toward addressing the questions 
identified in the previous section.  
 
Much research has been devoted to delineating the 
different forms that electoral corruption takes and 
describing the political economy of electoral malpractice 
(e.g. Mackenzie, 1958; Pravda, 1976; Rouquié, 1978; 
Birch, 1997; Elklit and Svensson, 1997; Bratton, 1998; 
Elklit, 1999; Callahan, 2000; Schedler, 2002a; Elklit and 
Reynolds 2002; 2005a; 2005b; Schaffer, 2002; 2007; 
Brusco et al., 2004; Case, 2006; D‟Anieri, 2005; Stokes, 
2005). A smaller body of scholarship has been concerned 
to examine the factors that condition perceptions of 
electoral corruption at mass level (McGann and 
Dominguez, 1998; Birch, 2008). 
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The systematic nature of electoral corruption is 
something that has been noted by virtually all 
commentators on this topic. The corruption of elections is 
not typically something that can be traced to individuals 
acting in isolation. Electoral corruption requires 
considerable logistical organisation, and as such it 
requires the collusion of many actors in different parts of 
the political system. 
 
The systematic nature of electoral corruption can also be 
traced to the structures that subtend and facilitate it. 
Institutions – and specifically electoral institutions – are 
central in this regard. The electoral management 
structure provides the overarching framework within 
which electoral conduct takes place. It is therefore not 
surprising that electoral management body design should 
have been found to influence the quality of electoral 
governance. In particular, effective electoral commission 
independence has been found to have a strong positive 
impact on electoral integrity  (Hartlyn, 1994; Lopez-Pintor, 
2000; Mozaffar, 2002; McCoy and Hartlyn, 2006).  
 
A second key finding is that single-member district 
electoral systems have been found to encourage 
electoral corruption to a greater extent than more 
proportional electoral systems (Lehoucq and Molina, 
2002; Birch, 2007). 
 
In addition to institutions, a key social structural factor 
that interacts with electoral corruption is the level of 
socio-economic development in a state, and a number of 
studies have linked lower level of socio-economic 
development with higher levels of electoral corruption 
(Gosnell, 1968; Scott, 1969; McDonald, 1972; Hartlyn, 
1994; Lehoucq, 2003; Stokes, 2005). In addition there is 
some evidence that wealth inequality within states is 
associated with higher levels of electoral corruption 
(Ziblatt, 2009). 
 
There is also a limited body of research that has 
investigated the interaction of electoral corruption with 
other sorts of corruption in the public sector, and other 
forms of corruption have been found to be one of the 
more important factors that facilitate malpractice in the 
electoral sphere (Birch, 2007). Thus different types of 
corruption hang together.  
Culture and values have been found to impact electoral 
corruption as well. In particular, the dominance of more 
traditional cultural forms has been identified as one of the 
background conditions that provides fertile ground for 
several different forms of electoral corruption, in particular 
those that involve the corruption of voters (McDonald, 
1972; Beck, 1997; Callahan, 2000; Schaffer and 
Schedler, 2005; Bermeo, 2010). 
 
Finally, the presence of international observers has 
generally been associated with improved election quality 
(Bjornlund, 2004; Council of Europe, 2008: 147-8; 
Goodwin-Gill, 1994: 78; but see Beaulieu and Hyde, 2008 
for a different perspective). 
 
A considerable amount of research has also enabled us 
better to understand how electoral corruption can be 
effectively reduced.  
 
In some cases, gradual social-structural and cultural 
changes over the years can result in an altered climate 
for electoral corruption, which may gradually become less 
prominent. 
 
Institutional change can also lead to abrupt changes in 
levels of electoral malpractice. For example, changes in 
suffrage requirements that gradually make vote-buying 
too expensive, which then generates impetus for reform 
(O‟Leary, 1962; O‟Gorman, 1996; Lehoucq and Molina, 
2002).  
 
Likewise governments may face such severe legitimacy 
crises that they are obliged to „clean up‟ their electoral 
process to prevent mass disturbances, as happened in 
Argentina prior to the Sáenz Peña law of 1912 (Díaz, 
1983).  
 
In other cases, electoral corruption can be dramatically 
reduced in a short period of time due to popular 
mobilisation, The „colour revolutions‟ that took place in 
Serbia in 2000, in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 
2004, where popular mobilisation resulted in fraudulent 
election results being overturned, has promoted a rash of 
studies that have helped us better to understand the 
conditions under which popular mobilisation can be of 
help in pressuring leaders to improve the quality of their 
elections. In other contexts also, popular mobilisation has 
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played an important role in bringing about reform 
(Eisenstadt, 1999; Magaloni, 2010). 
 
The impact of electoral corruption on other aspects of 
politics, society and the economy have also been the 
object of a number of studies. For example, Birch has 
found that when large sectors of the population believe 
that elections are corrupt, this has the effect of 
depressing turnout (Birch, 2010). 
 
In summary, scholars are only just beginning to study 
electoral corruption in a systematic way, but the research 
that does exist has identified a number of key causal 




Practical implications of research 
findings  
 
Electoral conduct is an area in which international actors 
have begun to play a larger role in recent years, as 
election monitoring, electoral assistance and standard-
setting in the electoral field has become more 
professional and more systematic (Pastor, 1999b).  
 
International law (the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights) stipulates that elections must be held periodically; 
in addition they must meet five criteria to be considered 
free and fair: they must be held (1) by secret ballot, (2) 
under universal and equal suffrage (3) in a non-
discriminatory manner (4) allowing direct choice and (5) 
free expression (Beigbeder, 1994; Goodwin-Gill, 1994; 
1998).  
 
There are also a number of approaches to electoral 
conduct that have come to be recognised as „best 
practice‟ by the international community, following debate 
and practical efforts undertaken by organisations such as 
the United Nations, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
International IDEA, and regional bodies.1 
 
There are an increasing number of organisations involved 
in electoral monitoring and assistance, from global 
intergovernmental organisation such as the United 
Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and International 
IDEA to regional bodies such as the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of 
Europe, Organization of American States and the African 
Union, to networks of electoral administrators - such as 
the Global Electoral Organization, the Association of 
Central and East European Election Officers - not to 
mention bilateral assistance projects and the work of 
international non-governmental organisations. 
 
At the same time, there is still no international convention 
or treaty that is primarily concerned with elections, and 
we still lack a major international body with the clout to 
serve as an international elections watchdog or to 
adjudicate in the case of disputes; in other words, the 
international elections „regime‟ remains patchy and 
under-developed despite the fact that a vast amount of 
effort and resources have gone into strengthening 
electoral conduct over the course of the post-war period. 
International legal institutions have not developed as far 
in the electoral sphere as in some other areas – e.g. 
trade, defence, or environmental regulation. The 
international elections regime is a hotchpotch of different 
regional organisations that monitor elections and offer 
electoral assistance. 
 
This situation has implications for the ways in which 
states respond to international efforts to comment on and 
improve the quality of elections; it also has implications 
for electoral assistance itself. The weakness and 
fragmentation of the international electoral regime means 
that making assistance conditional on maintaining certain 
standards is somewhat more difficult that might be the 
case in another area. It also means that though electoral 
processes can be evaluated in relation to a relatively 
coherent set of international norms (see, for example, 
Elklit and Raynolds, 2005a; Boda, 2005; Katz, 2005; 
Council of Europe, 2008), domestic standards and norms 
are of overwhelming importance in the evaluation of 
electoral processes by political actors within states. 
 
Another consequence of the weakness of the 
international electoral regime is that there are limited 
channels through which the findings of research on 
electoral corruption can be put into practice in any 
systematic ways. But this is not to suggest that these 
findings are not relevant or that they cannot inform 
practice in the sphere of electoral conduct. 
 8 
Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution – Briefing Paper (IDCR-BP-05/11) 
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IDCR) 
Part of the University of Essex Knowledge Gateway 
 
© Sarah Birch 2011 
 
The research findings that are arguably of most practical 
relevance are those that relate to the role of institutions 
and the role of civil society in holding governments to 
account for the quality of the elections they hold. 
 
The practical relevance of the findings on electoral 
institutions goes without saying; institutions are among 
the easiest aspects of a political system to alter, and if the 
institutional determinants of electoral corruption can be 
identified, this can provide valuable advice for those who 
are in a position to initiate electoral reform as well as 
those who engage in democratic assistance. The 
importance of maintaining genuine electoral commission 
independence is one of the more relevant lessons from 
the research on electoral corruption. 
  
The impact of electoral system design, and in particular 
the negative impact of single-member district electoral 
systems on electoral integrity, is also an important finding 
that could well be of relevance in informing the practice of 
electoral reform in a number of contexts.  
 
The importance of popular mobilisation in maintaining or 
improving the quality of elections also has considerable 
practical relevance. Those active in the area of 
democracy assistance have played a key role in 
developing mechanisms through which members of the 
public and civil society grounds can hold their 
governments to account for the quality of the elections 
they deliver. Tools such as domestic monitoring and 
quick counts have played a huge role in increasing the 
capacity of civil society in promoting good electoral 
governance. 
 
Summary and conclusions  
 
It is often remarked that democracy involves far more 
than the holding of free and fair elections. Commentators 
then typically move straight on to discuss all the aspects 
of that „more‟, without considering in detail the role of free 
and fair elections in a democracy. While it is undeniably 
true that free and fair elections do not a democracy make, 
they are nevertheless an essential component of any 
democracy. In the modern world, electoral corruption is 
one of the major obstacles to democratisation; it is also a 
significant problem in many established democracies. 
The research findings in the field can be summed up 
under a number of different claims: firstly, electoral 
corruption is systematic and operates by leveraging 
existing resources and structures in the society in which it 
operates. The systematic nature of electoral corruption 
means that it can never be entirely eliminated, but it can 
be significantly reduced if the structures and attitudes on 
which it relies are altered.   
 
Secondly, institutions matter: institutional factors - from 
the overall architecture of the electoral system to electoral 
body management design and many other more minor 
aspects of the electoral regime - can be important in 
structuring the opportunities and the incentives that face 
political actors who might potentially be tempted to 
engage in electoral corruption.   
 
Thirdly, electoral corruption is integrated into the political 
economy of a state in complex ways, and to understand 
how elections are corrupted in a state, it is necessary to 
have a good understanding of the way power is 
structured by both formal and informal institutions. It is for 
this reason that quick technical fixes are often ineffective 
in improving the quality of elections, as they do not 
engage with the underlying role of electoral corruption in 
regime maintenance. Institutional reform can be effective 
in improving the quality of elections, but only when that 
reform simultaneously works to restructure power 
relations and change the incentives under which key 
political actors operate. 
 
Electoral corruption is a subject of tremendous 
importance, but the systematic study of electoral 
corruption is just beginning. Within political science this is 
currently a „hot topic‟, and more and more scholars are 
beginning to study this problem. At the same, time, it is 
the practitioner community, not political scientists, that 
has been most active in developing means of reducing 
electoral corruption, such as domestic and international 
monitoring, quick counts, analysis of the legal frameworks 
governing elections and other means of holding regimes 
to account for the quality of the elections they hold. The 
literature mentioned above on the „colour revolutions‟ are 
an exception in this regard, but political scientists have a 
long way to go before they can provide a coherent 
theoretical account of how to reduce electoral corruption. 
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Much work remains to be done in the emerging field of 
electoral corruption, but the research that has been 
carried out to date has begun to give us insight into what 
drives this important phenomenon and the range of tools 
that can be employed to address it. Further research is 
required further to explore both the causes and the 
consequences of electoral corruption and to broaden our 




 1 See, for example, the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
„Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections‟ at 
http://www.ipu.org/Cnl-e/154-free.htm and the Council of 
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